The Nature of Doctrine and Neo-Restoration

Some of us involved in the discussion have been thinking about George Lindbeck's The Nature of Doctrine(NoD hereafter), which has above all an ecumenical impetus. As a major root of all the narrative, emergent, post-foundational, post-modern, post-ect. theologies winning the day, I find it fascinating, not to mention insightful on a slightly different level than the terms in which "story" is typically cast by the evangelicals looking for less foundational foundations on which to proceed. I read NoD for the first time last year for a Contemporary Christian Thought class. This year I read it for Systematic Theology. Typically I would revolt at the same reading assigned by the same teacher even in two different classes, but since I hadn't understood much the first time through I was excited to have another go at it. No one here is claiming to have fully grasped what Lindbeck is getting at, but I feel like I've got an inkling, and it seems apparent to me why so much productive thinking has spun off of this work in the last two decades.

His thesis is as follows:

Stated more technically, a religion can be viewed as a kind of cultural and/or linguistic framework or medium that shapes the entirety of life and thought. It functions somewhat like a Kantian a priori, although in this case the a priori is a set of acquired skills that could be different. It is not primarily an array of beliefs about the true and the good (though it may involve these), or a symbol expressive of basic attitudes, feelings, or sentiments (though these will be generated). Rather it is similar to an idiom that makes possible the description of realities, the formulation of beliefs, and the experiencing of inner attitudes, feelings, and sentiments. Like a culture or language, it is a communal phenomenon that shapes the subjectivities of individuals rather than being primarily a manifestation of those subjectivities. It comprises a vocabulary of discursive and nondiscursive symbols together with a discursive logic or grammar in terms of which this vocabulary can be meaningfully deployed. Lastly, just as language (or "language game," to use Wittgenstein's phrase) is correlated with a form of life, and just as a culture has both cognitive and behavioral dimensions, so it is also in the case of a religious tradition. Its doctrines, cosmic stories or myths, and ethical directives are integrally related to the rituals it practices, the sentiments or experiences it evokes, the actions it recommends, and the institutional forms it develops.

Now that I have taken due care to let his words speak for themselves, I will be speaking in my own terms in order to explain what in the world he means. The uninitiated foundationalist reader will be quickly sidetracked by Lindbeck's seeming disregard for ontological truth. And because what Lindbeck is offering is most basically an alternative to a view that is preoccupied with being doctrinally "right" about every jot and tittle, there is a good deal of tension created over the issue of Truth. Much grief and wasting of time might be foregone if readers will recognize that Lindbeck repeatedly affirms the existence of ontological truth and the possibility of doctrine functioning to state such truth. Even in the quote above, his point is that doctrine is not "primarily an array of beliefs about the true...though it may involve these." I start with this issue in hopes that if we are not harboring an argument on the point of truth we may more clearly understand his positive proposal.

What then is the primary function of doctrine? On Lindbeck's analogy, doctrine is the "grammar" of the language that is religion. It governs the use of those components that comprise a religion--symbols, language, actions. Religion gives one a way to speak about God, and doctrine brings organization and consistency to that language. Some example and some points of confusion should be considered.

Examples
Justification. Luther articulated his doctrine of justification in the context of Catholic abuses. Catholics anathematized Reformation dissenters from the truth. Protestants condemned, if less formally, Catholic perverters of the truth. There was all around doctrinal wrangling, because everyone has a claim on the truth. Today we are well aware of the relativism that emerges from the various and unprovable claims upon truth that exist. Any one of them offers an example, but the doctrine of justification is so poignant because of its essential place in Christian religion. We may be more willing (and I hope so) to feel lenient about less important (less "weighty," if you prefer biblical language) doctrines, but we must consider it important to speak truth about something like how a sinner is made righteous before God. Important enough to cause the greatest division in Church history. Happily, the comments on my last post brought up Paul's own anathematizing, highlighting the point that if we are going to get really riled about something, justification (at issue in Gal.) is a likely candidate.

Yet, in the last century the ecumenical movement has witnessed a nearly unfathomable reconciliation between the Protestant and Catholic doctrines of justification. Given this reality we must come to terms with the fact that even our most important doctrines do not serve to express with finality what is. It cannot be said that doctrines are ever meant to fall short of truth, much less meant to deceive. Nor does the recognition of a more primary function of doctrine than making truth claims imply that a shoulder-shrugging apathy toward unattainable truth is appropriate. Lindbeck's insights do not necessarily lead to radical relativism. Rather, they allow us to realize that while doctrine may attempt to speak truth, its serves another purpose that is not dependent upon the completeness or correctness of that truth claim.

The weakness of the justification example will be ignorance on the part of many as to exactly what the Catholic doctrine was in Reformation times. Let it be said simply that, although this writer is Protestant, Catholics are not to be painted here as indulgence slinging sell-outs. There was a need on both sides to speak about Christian justification. For Luther, it needed to be articulated in contrast to Catholic doctrine. Luther's grammar for speaking about the religious confession of salvation in Christ did not allow for particular tenets of popular medieval Catholicism. Certain things could be said, certain things could not. Equally, Catholic articulation of doctrine at the time was necessarily in reaction to Luther, et al. The point is that statements of doctrine on both sides, statements made by theologians and teachers for the ears of the rest of the Church, intended to guide the Church's way of thinking and speaking about a fundamental belief that justification is available in Christ. In the long awaited absence of the need for either side to speak in contrast to the other, the grammar changed and permitted a conversation in the same language.

For those who are struggling not to think that Luther was just right (works righteousness is bad and faith alone is good) and the Catholics just wrong, I mention the fruit of the "exegetical round table" advocated in my last post. The "new perspective on Paul" (e.g., E.P. Sanders, James D.G. Dunn, N.T. Wright, and others [see http://www.thepaulpage.com/]) emphasizes how Paul is not talking about works righteousness like that which Luther protested in popular Catholicism. If this is true, and I think it is, the implication for the popular evangelical understanding of justification is mind-boggling. Having been so dogged in our supposedly biblical, Pauline understanding of justification, how can we possibly explain a change of position--a different doctrine. We demanded that it was True. What happens when we learn otherwise?

The point is not that all grammars are equal. There are ways of speaking that are illegitimate. It is difficult not to think of illegitimacy in terms of falsehood, for illegitimate grammar is necessarily false as well. But that is not, at root, the standard by which it is judged illegitimate as a way religious speech. Another example: The Nicean doctrine of the Trinity. Arianism is both false as a truth claim and illegitimate as a doctrine. Functinally Nicea explicates proper ways to speak about God and Christ in contrast to Arianism. As a grammar it does not allow a Christian to speak of the Word as a god, as created, etc. That is illegitimate speech. It also requires a Christian to speak about God in terms of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, etc. As a grammar Nicea functions perfectly. As a truth claim it is problematic, since even its framers had a healthy respect for the mystery surrounding God's ontology. Given my own dislike of some metaphysical presuppositions undergirding the Nicean formulation (impassibility, immutability), I'm willing to say that it's hardly True. What matters, though, is that in its context it guides Christians to speak about the divinity of Jesus manifest in the Christian story, which is the standard by which the grammar is judged. This leads us to some needed clarifications.

Points of Confusion
What is it that the doctrine controls; what is the language regulated by the grammar? It is the Christian narrative. Perhaps the story intends to make truth claims. Perhaps God whispered truth in the ears of the writers. Perhaps doctrine is nothing more than the rehearsal of Bible words. Perhaps Paul's propositions trump Luke's narrative. This post already grows long, so views of scripture will have to wait for another day. We will assume for now that doctrine is something other than simple recitation and that Scripture supplies us the content of our Christian idiom. The religious utterance or symbolic act comes first, taken from the story, available to us in the Bible. Doctrine follows as we make assertions about how we can and cannot use that language.

To confess that the death of Christ justifies me before God is a statement of faith. How then will I speak about that justification? Certain ideas resonate with the story and certain ideas do not. For example, I might say that the blood shed on the cross justifies me as an appeasing sacrifice. I might say that Christ justifies me by receiving the just punishment in my place. I might say that I am actually made righteous, as a new being. I might say that I am actually a sinner with borrowed righteousness. All of these resonate with the story, and while it might ease our minds to say that they are all true, we must also recognize that they are saying different things. The nuance of each is different, but they all guide the confession that man is justified by the death of Christ. A doctrine does not become the ultimate standard by which other possible doctrines are judged. If this were so, then when the affirmation is made, "the cross is an appeasing sacrifice," another affirmation, such as, "the cross is a substitutionary act" would necessarily be judged false. The story is the ultimate standard by which the doctrines are judged.

As "grammar" a doctrine does rule out certain other grammars. "The cross is an appeasing sacrifice" does not permit one also to speak of justification as having nothing to do with the wrath of God. Thus, a false doctrine would be, "Justification is a purely legal matter." "The cross is substitutionary act" does allow one to say the cross is a legal matter, but it does not allow one to say, "Justification is a matter of grace, not justice." And so on. Grammar essentially demands coherence or internal consistency. Legitimate doctrines inherently represent the story, thus act as a standard in that way, but they are not comprehensive enough to be the final standard. A doctrine of justification that includes Jewish ethnicity is not necessarily incoherent with either substitution or appeasement, for neither of them intends to place the emphasis on Christ. Thus other doctrines arise from the story to make the point. God justifies through Christ alone. Justification comes through faith. And so on. These statements are then explained in terms of their coherence with other doctrines. Only one who keeps the law perfectly is an acceptable legal substitute. Only a blameless sacrifice appeases. To become preoccupied with the ultimate truth of these statements misses the point that it may need to be said a different way at a different time, in order to preserve or create coherence. Such utterances must only continue to resonate with the story.

I've done no justice to Lindbeck. Insofar as I grasp his idea, these are the points I wish to apply to Neo-Restoration. The way the grammar is formulated depends on what is legitimate speech in the situation. If you ask a group of Church of Christ goers on any given Sunday what the Lord's Supper---a symbolic religious act taken from the story---means, you will get a variety of doctrines. If you ask the same question among a variety of denominations, you will get still more doctrines. Their ways of speaking about the act are not mutually exclusive. We have come, in the Church of Christ, to realize that our emphasis on "the right reason" or "proper understanding" has been extreme. Within that obsession is the requirement of exhaustive comprehension of the truth before the Lord's Supper or Baptism, e.g., "count." I will disregard the simplistic argument that such is impossible for any one person anyway. Rather, let us recognize that we do not formulate and teach doctrine in order to nail down exactly and exclusively what is true. It is the inevitable despair of that task that leads to total relativism. We can appreciate our way of speaking on Sunday morning as coherent in our context. We can appreciate an Episcopal way of speaking as appropriate in its context. We can appreciate the language we share and, more importantly, the story we share. On that ground we move forward in dialogue, learning from each other as those who desire to speak about the story in faithful ways.

Now, how do we decide what points of disagreement about what resonates with the story are worth anathematizing over. I think the NT writers' theological process is indicative. Unrepentance is separate issue, and I'm glad the distinction has been made in previous comments. False teaching is our concern here. Paul takes a hard stand when very fundamental aspects of the story are compromised. Perhaps I am unwise for stating it publicly, but I can muster some degree of bravery in the hope that NR may make a genuine contribution. There is absolutely no comparison between the teaching of the Judaizers addressed in Galatians and the teaching of those who understand baptism differently that the Church of Christ. It is unacceptable, unthinkable, to undermine the essence of the gospel--what God has done in Christ for all men--as the Judaizers did. Baptism is not the essence of the gospel, and it is disgraceful that we would so devalue the fulfillment of the Abrahamic covenant as to make baptism an issue of equal importance. Paul anathematizes because his opponents miss the purpose of the culmination of everything God has done. I am not willing to assign the doctrine baptism so much significance. There may be others of equal importance (and I think there are). My belief is that we must think in terms of what the whole story presents as fundamental. To make all doctrine equal--to make baptism so important--assumes the erroneous belief that our goal is to be doctinally right about the truth and that to be wrong about the truth is damning. To be wrong about any one point is then just as damning as being wrong about what God has done in Christ. Lindbeck's proposal, I think, is liberating in that regard.

Sorry if there are lots of typos, I'll correct them gradually.